Time Line: The History of the Supreme Court
This is a time line of landmark cases handed down by the Supreme Court since 1792. The cases are organized according to the major themes of this site. Click on any theme name for an expanded time line.
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| Hylton v. U.S.
(1793)
Decided by a vote of 3 to 0. Conflict: (Article I, Power to Tax; Judicial Review) In 1794, the United States Congress passed "An act to lay duties upon carriages for the conveyance of persons." During the debate in Congress the emerging Jeffersonian faction argued that Congress had exceeded its constitutional taxing authority. The bill passed and a tax of $16 was levied on each carriage used to transport people, whether for business or private use. Daniel Lawrence Hylton, a wealthy merchant in Virginia, agreed to test the law's constitutionality, which had a disproportionate impact on Virginians, who owned a larger number of carriages than other Americans. Hylton claimed to own 125 "chariots," for his own private use. The United States sued Hylton for failure to pay $2,000 in taxes (Knowing the claim was fictional, both parties agreed that if Hylton lost the case he would pay only $16.) Federal tax authorities, including Secretary of the Treasury Alexander Hamilton, the Jeffersonians' archrival, also wished to test the law, hoping the Federalist-leaning judges would uphold national taxing authority. Hylton contested the constitutionality of the Carriage Act in the Federal Circuit Court of Virginia. His lawyer, John Taylor, claimed the carriage duty was a uniform, direct tax, forbidden under Article I, Section 9, clause 4, which required all direct taxes to be proportional, based on the population and number of representatives of each state. The government argued that it was an indirect tax, legal under Article I, Section 8, clause 1. Attorney General Charles Lee argued the case on its constitutional merits; Alexander Hamilton argued it on its economic merits, citing Adam Smith and the Wealth of Nations, which was quoted in the Justice Samuel Chase's decision. Opinion: At the time of Hylton v. United States, the Supreme Court had not yet adopted the format of delivering an opinion. Instead, the justices delivered the decision ad seriatim, that is, one after the next, beginning with the junior member of the Court (Justice Samuel Chase) and concluding with the senior member of the court (Justice James Wilson.) Chief Justice Oliver Ellsworth, having been sworn in the morning of the decision, declined to participate; Justice William Cushing also declined, having missed arguments due to "indisposition." The three participating judges (Samuel Chase, William Paterson, and James Iredell) unanimously declared the carriage levy to be an indirect tax, and therefore constitutional. Context: Although the Supreme Court may try to be apolitical in theory, it has been drawn into political controversy from its earliest days. George Washington may have despised political factions, but the basic ideologies of modern political parties have their roots in the differing world-views of two members of his cabinet, Alexander Hamilton (Secretary of Treasury) and Thomas Jefferson (Secretary of State.) During the ratification of the U.S. Constitution, splits began to form in the ranks of the leaders of the Revolutionary period; for example, George Mason refused to sign fellow Virginian James Madison's proposed Constitution. With the onset, moreover, of the French Revolution and the Napoleonic era, alliances, formed during the ratification of the Constitution, fractured--Alexander Hamilton and John Jay (the first Chief Justice) were at odd with co-Federalist author James Madison; Declaration of Independence committee members John Adams and Thomas Jefferson had a long, bitter falling out before reconciling in their old age. The Jeffersonian Democratic-Republican faction did not have control of the U.S. Congress or the presidency in 1796, so it worked for change on two levels. The emerging political party expressed its ideas through print and by contesting elections, to win political power. It also worked for change through the federal courts, hoping that the third branch of government would check and balance acts of Congress that the Jeffersonians believed would over-empower the national government. Hylton v. United States represents the beginning of a distinctly American form of political challenge: a constitutional test case. This early judicial review case was unusual, too, in that the Jeffersonians hoped the Supreme Court would strike down (rather than uphold) an act of Congress. The Court's decision was controversial because it sustained the Carriage Act (and because the justices were Hamiltonian Federalists.) Although the Supreme Court exercised its power of judicial review in the case, the partisan brawls continued to hobble the Court's stature. Impact/Consequences: Although the Carriage Tax was repealed shortly after Jefferson was inaugurated, on April 6, 1789, the case has had lasting consequences. Hylton v. United States was the first case in which the United States Supreme Court was called upon to review the constitutionality of an act of Congress, and upheld it. It is the Court's first step in the direction of judicial review, as envisioned by Alexander Hamilton in Federalist 78. Although the Court did not directly address the issue, the justices clearly assumed that they had the power to declare null and void acts of Congress that violated the Constitution. It would remain for Chief Justice John Marshall to directly state in Marbury v. Madison (1803) the powers of judicial review under the Constitution. Furthermore, the justices' discussion of what constitutes a direct tax has helped to shape federal tax policy to the present. The reason for Congress stating that direct taxes can only be levied proportionally stemmed from the arbitrary taxation without representation imposed on the Colonies by the British, which was a direct cause of the American Revolution. Also, southern states feared that northern representatives to Congress might place special taxes on slaves. With this decision, the Court narrowed the definition of direct taxes, paving the way for an excise tax and for income taxes, neither of which affected everyone equally. Quotes: "The tax on carriages succeeded in spite of the Constitution by a majority of 20, the advocates of the principle being re-enforced by the adversaries of luxury."--James Madison, May 7, 1794, letter "The argument turned entirely upon this point, whether the tax on carriages for the conveyance of persons, kept for private use, was a direct tax? For, if it was not a direct tax, it was admitted to be rightly laid, within the first clause of the eighth section of the first article of the Constitution, which declares 'that all duties, imposts and excises, shall be uniform throughout the United States:' But it was contended, that if it was a direct tax, it was unconstitutionally laid, as another clause of the same section provides, 'that no capitation, or other direct, tax shall be laid, unless in proportion to the census, or enumeration, of the inhabitants of the United States.' 1796 Hylton v. United States "As I do not think the tax on carriages is a direct tax, it is unnecessary, at this time, for me to determine, whether this court, constitutionally possesses the power to declare an act of Congress void, on the ground of its being made contrary to, and in violation of, the Constitution; but if the court have such power, I am free to declare, that I will never exercise it, but in a very clear case. I am for affirming the judgment of the Circuit Court."--Justice Samuel Chase, 1796 Hylton v. United States opinion "The provision was made in favor of the southern States. They possessed a large number of slaves; they had extensive tracts of territory, thinly settled, and not very productive. A majority of the states had but few slaves, and several of them a limited territory, well settled, and in a high state of cultivation. The southern states, if no provision had been introduced in the Constitution, would have been wholly at the mercy of the other states. Congress in such cases, might tax slaves, at discretion or arbitrarily, and land in every part of the Union after the same rate or measure: so much a head in the first instance, and so much an acre in the second. To guard them against imposition in these particulars, was the reason of introducing the clause in the Constitution, which directs that representatives and direct taxes shall be apportioned among the states, according to their respective numbers."--Justice William Patterson, 1796 Hylton v. United States opinion Questions to Ponder:
Selected Bibliography: Wiecek, William M. Liberty Under Law: The Supreme Court in American Life. (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 1988.) Levy, Leonard W. Seasoned Judgments: The American Constitution, Rights, and History. (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1995.) Urofsky, Melvin, and Paul Finkelman, eds. Documents of American Constitutional and Legal History. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002.) Gateway Links: |
| Chisholm v. GA
(1793)
Decided by a vote of 4 to 1. Conflict: (Article III, State Sovereignty; Federal Judicial Jurisdiction) In 1777, Captain Robert Farquhar, a merchant of South Carolina, sold clothing to the colony of Georgia valued at $169,613.33. Shortly afterwards, Farquhar (a Loyalist) returned to England where he died in 1784. Georgia, like many other colonies during the American Revolution, passed a law "sequestering" or freezing debts owed to Loyalists. The executor of Farquhar's estate, Alexander Chisholm, argued that Georgia should pay since the contract had been agreed upon prior to the sequestering act. Georgia refused to appear in the suit, claiming that it was immune to such suits as an independent and sovereign state. This stand by Georgia directly challenged Article III, section 2, of the Constitution, which authorized the Supreme Court to hear disputes between "a state and Citizens of another state." Opinion: At the time of Chisholm v. Georgia, the Supreme Court had not yet adopted the format of delivering an opinion. Instead, the justices delivered the decision ad seriatim, that is, one after the next, beginning with the junior member of the Court (Justice James Iredell) and concluding with the senior member of the court (Chief Justice John Jay.) Justice Thomas Johnson was absent for this case and resigned from the Court two months later. Four of the five participating justices declared that the Supreme Court had jurisdiction in the case and that Georgia owed Farquhar's estate the payment Chisholm had demanded. The majority determined that, under Article III and the intent of the framers, the Supreme Court not only had jurisdiction in the case but was required to hear suits brought against the states. Justice James Iredell dissented, believing that Article III gave Congress the power to grant sovereign immunity to the states from the jurisdiction of the federal courts, and without any Congressional directions one way or the other, the Supreme Court lacked jurisdiction. The majority ruled against Georgia, holding it in default for not appearing. Context: This was the first important case heard by the Court and it opened up a vigorous debate about the sovereignty of the states and the nature of the newly formed government of the United States. A literal reading of Article III, section 2, leaves little doubt but that the Supreme Court holds jurisdiction in disputes between a state and citizens of another state. But in the ratification debates defenders of the Constitution, known at the time as Federalists, had promised that the courts would never interpret this to mean that citizens of one state could actually sue another state. The only way this could happen is if a state agreed to the suit. With Chisholm, supporters of state sovereignty felt betrayed. They especially resented the words of Justices James Wilson, who declared in that sovereignty resided in the people of the United States and not in the state: "As to purposes of the Union, therefore, Georgia is not a sovereign state." For Wilson, and the Court's majority, the people had created a nation, and Article Three explicitly stated that its judicial power should extend over such controversies as Chisholm. By claiming that Georgia could be sued, the Court rejected the contention by the Anti-Federalists that states within the Union, were vested with the attributes of sovereignty relative to the federal government. Impact/Consequences: Public reaction to the Supreme Court's decision in Chisholm v. Georgia was explosive. Many feared that enemies of the American Revolution would use the courts to drain hard currency from the young republic. Others, including the editorial writers in leading newspapers, declared that this decision would allow the federal government to absorb state and local governments and create a new monarchy. John Hancock called a special session of the Massachusetts Legislature, which passed a resolution demanding that Congress amend the Constitution so that lawsuits against a state by citizens of a different state or foreign nation would be illegal. Two days after the decision in Chisholm was announced a resolution asking for such an amendment was introduced in the U.S. Senate. The draft amendment was approved by Congress and sent to the states on March 4, 1794. Ten months later, on January 5, 1795, with North Carolina's ratification, the three-fourths requirement was met. Oddly, President John Adams did not formally announce ratification until three years later, on January 8, 1798. (In 1922, the Supreme Court ruled that presidential action was not necessary for an amendment to become part of the Constitution, but instead becomes law the moment three-fourths of the states approve the amendment.) Chisholm v. Georgia, thus, is one of only three Supreme Court cases to date to have been overturned by constitutional amendment, in this case the Eleventh Amendment. (Two days after Adams announced the Eleventh Amendment, the Supreme Court overturned Chisholm with its decision in Hollingsworth v. Virginia.) Chisholm was subsequently joined by the Dred Scott decision, overturned by the Thirteenth Amendment, and the 1895 income tax case, Pollock v. Farmers Loan & Trust Co., overturned by the Sixteenth Amendment. The reaction of the public to Chisholm taught the Court a valuable lesson, namely that it is not a good idea to render decisions that conflict with a public opinion that is widespread and deeply felt. In subsequent Court decisions, especially during the long service of Chief Justice John Marshall, the Court kept these risks in mind. Although the Eleventh Amendment became part of the Constitution, subsequent judicial interpretations of this amendment allowed suits against state officers who allegedly violated the constitutional and civil rights of individuals. This pragmatic interpretation of the amendment occurred principally in the last half of the twentieth century, when public opinion turned decidedly against state sovereignty in some matters of privacy, civil rights, and individual freedoms. Quotes: "My conception of the Constitution is entirely different. I conceive, that all the Courts of the United States must receive ... all their authority, as to the manner of their proceeding, from the Legislature only ... If therefore, this Court is to be (as I consider it) the organ of the Constitution and the law, not of the Constitution only, in respect to the manner of its proceeding, we must receive our directions from the Legislature in this particular...."--Justice James Iredell, 1793 Chisholm v. Georgia dissent "Whoever considers, in a combined and comprehensive view, the general texture of the Constitution, will be satisfied, that the people of the United States intended to form themselves into a nation for national purposes. They instituted, for such purposes, a national Government, complete in all its parts, with powers Legislative, Executive and Judiciary; and, in all those powers, extending over the whole nation. Is it congruous, that, with regard to such purposes, any man or body of men, any person natural or artificial, should be permitted to claim successfully an entire exemption from the jurisdiction of the national Government? Would not such claims, crowned with success, be repugnant to our very existence as a nation? When so many trains of deduction, coming from different quarters, converge and unite, at last, in the same point; we may safely conclude, as the legitimate result of this Constitution, that the State of Georgia is amenable to the jurisdiction of this Court."--Justice James Wilson, 1793 Chisholm v. Georgia opinion "Let us now turn to the Constitution. The people therein declare, that their design in establishing it, comprehended six objects. 1st. To form a more perfect union. 2nd. To establish justice. 3rd. To ensure domestic tranquility. 4th. To provide for the common defence. 5th. To promote the general welfare. 6th. To secure the blessings of liberty to themselves and their posterity.... It may be asked, what is the precise sense and latitude in which the words 'to establish justice,' as here used, are to be understood? The answer to this question will result from the provisions made in the Constitution on this head. They are specified in the second section of the third article, where it is ordained, that the judicial power of the United States shall extend to ten descriptions of cases... The exception contended for, would contradict and do violence to the great and leading principles of a free and equal national government, one of the great objects of which is, to ensure justice to all: To the few against the many, as well as to the many against the few."--Chief Justice John Jay, 1793 Chisholm v. Georgia opinion "The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution ... between a State and Citizens of another State...."--Article III, Section 2, Constitution of the United States "The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens of Subjects of any Foreign State."--Amendment XI (Ratified February 7, 1795). Questions to Ponder:
Selected Bibliography: Eaton, Thomas A. and Michael Wells. Constitutional Remedies: A Reference Guide to the United States Constitution. (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 2002.) Epstein, Lita. The Complete Idiot's Guide to: The Supreme Court. (Indianapolis, IN: Alpha Books, 2004.) Johnson, John W., ed. Historic U.S. Court Cases: An Encyclopedia. 2d ed. (New York: Routledge, 2001.) Gateway Links: |
| GA v. Brailsford
(1794)
Decided by a vote of 6 to 2. Conflict: (Article III, State Sovereignty; Federal Supremacy) Samuel Brailsford, a British subject and Loyalist during the American Revolution, had won a lower court judgment to recover property owned him by a Georgia citizen. After the Revolutionary War, Georgia passed a law permitting the confiscation of Loyalist property, which included debts owed to them. Georgia asked the Court to stop the recovery of what amounted to confiscated property. Justice James Iredell, in his capacity as circuit judge, denied Georgia's claim; the Court ruled that the federal Treaty of Paris, which ended the American Revolution and normalized relations with Great Britain--including the protection of Loyalist properties, had nullified Georgia's law. Opinion: At the time of Georgia v. Brailsford, the Supreme Court followed the English practice of delivering serial opinions, starting with the junior member of the Court. The resulting string of opinions, beginning with a dissent written by Justice Thomas Johnson, is the first reported decision of the Supreme Court. It also established the tradition of dissent that became one of the Court's most important hallmarks. The Court's majority granted Georgia an injunction barring Brailsford's recovery of the money in question until a special jury could hear the case. The Court then convened a special jury, instructing it in such a manner that made its decision for Brailsford a foregone conclusion. Context: One year earlier, in February 1793, the Supreme Court had provoked a national uproar with its decision in Chisholm v. Georgia. A 4-1 ruling concluded that the Supreme Court had jurisdiction to hear a lawsuit brought against Georgia by an individual of another state or country. Within two days the U.S. Senate introduced an amendment reversing the Court's opinion which was ratified in ten months as the Eleventh Amendment. The reaction to the Chisholm case was so intense that the Supreme Court did not dare to issue a writ to a federal marshal to enforce its judgment to collect money due Chisholm from Georgia. Given the political firestorm surrounding Chisholm and its inability to enforce its will, the Supreme Court was reluctant to rule against Georgia a second time. The injunction allowed the Court to delay a direct confrontation; the jury trial allowed the ruling against Georgia to come from a jury rather than from the Supreme Court directly. Impact/Consequences: This was the first case in which the Supreme Court established the principle that a jury has the right and duty to examine not only the facts of the case, but also the law. Justice John Jay's charge to the jury asserted that justice was the primary objective of the Supreme Court while also suggesting that state law could not conflict with a United States treaty, an early suggestion of federal supremacy. Quotes: "...provided a demonstration to me of these facts: that the Premier [Jay] aimed for a cultivation of Southern popularity; that the Professor [Wilson] knows not an iota of equity; that the North Carolinian [Iredell] repented of the first ebullitions of a warm temper; and that it will take a score of years to settle, with such a mixture of Judges, a regular course in Chancery."--Attorney General Edmund Randolph to James Madison, 1792, letter "It may not be amiss, here, Gentlemen, to remind you of the good old rule, that on questions of fact, it is the province of the jury, on questions of law, it is the province of the court to decide. But it must be observed that by the same law, which recognizes this reasonable distribution of jurisdiction, you have nevertheless a right to take upon yourselves to judge of both, and to determine the law as well as the fact in controversy. On this, and on every other occasion, however, we have no doubt, you will pay that respect, which is due to the opinion of the court: For, as on the one hand, it is presumed, that juries are the best judges of facts; it is, on the other hand, presumbable, that the courts are the best judges of the law. But still both objects are lawfully, within your power of decision."--Chief Justice John Jay, 1794 Georgia v. Brailsford jury charge. Questions to Ponder:
Selected Bibliography: Bates, Ernest Sutherland. The Story of the Supreme Court. (Indianapolis, IN: Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1936.) Friedman, Leon and Fred Israel. The Justices of the Supreme Court: Their Lives and Major Opinions. Vol. 1. (New York: Chelsea House Publishers, 1997.) Schwartz, Bernard. A History of the Supreme Court. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993.) Stern, Robert, Eugene Gressman, Stephen Shapiro and Kenneth Geller. Supreme Court Practice, 8th ed. (Washington, DC: BNA Books, 2002.) Gateway Links: |
| Fletcher v. Peck
(1810)
Decided by a vote of 7 to 0. Conflict: (Article I, Contract Clause; Federal Supremacy and Judicial Review) Following the American Revolution, Georgia claimed 35 million acres of land along the Yazoo River (most of modern Mississippi and Alabama.) On January 7, 1795, the Georgia legislature granted large tracts of Yazoo land to four land companies, including the Georgia Land Company, for the low price of 1 ½ cents per acre. Georgia voters were outraged when they learned that the land speculators had bribed all but one member of the legislature. On February 13, 1796, the new legislature revoked the land grants, taking back the land from the four companies and from individuals who had purchased land from those companies. Land speculators looked for a way to challenge the legislation. Since they could not sue Georgia in federal court (because of the Eleventh Amendment), or in Georgia state courts (due to legislative act), they created a rather circuitous test case. Robert Fletcher (of New Hampshire) agreed to buy 15,000 acres of land in 1803 from John Peck (of Massachusetts), who had acquired the land as part of the 1795 grant to the Georgia Land Company. Fletcher sued Peck for breach of contract in the Federal Circuit Court in Massachusetts. He demanded that Peck return the $30,000 he had paid for land that Peck did not own because of Georgia's invalidation of the original land grant. The case questioned the constitutionality of the Georgia law revoking the land grants as a violation of the Contract Clause of the Constitution. Opinion: Chief Justice John Marshall delivered the opinion of a unanimous Court declaring the 1796 Georgia legislature's rescinding act to be unconstitutional. Marshall did so for two reasons. First, he argued it was not within the power of the judiciary to inquire into the motives of the legislative branch, affirming separation of powers. Second, he declared that the 1795 grant was a contract, thus the 1796 rescinding act had violated the contract clause of the U.S. Constitution. Context: The original four companies purchased the Yazoo lands for $500,000. On the day the legislature repealed the 1795 grant, 11 million acres were sold for $1,138,000 at a profit of 650 percent. Total profits by Yazoo land speculators between 1794 and 1814 are estimated to be over $3,500,000. There was a great deal of money at stake in Fletcher v. Peck, along with a great deal of land. Although President James Madison and his Republican-Democrats who controlled Congress were unhappy with Federalist John Marshall's decision, they were divided about how to progress and the War of 1812 intervened. Finally, in 1814, Congress passed a bill to settle the Yazoo land claims and purchase title to the land. The U.S. government paid $4.2 million to landowners although the settlement of claims dragged on for decades. Impact/Consequences: This was the first case in which the Supreme Court declared a state law unconstitutional. It is also the first time the Court reviewed the contract clause of Article I, Section 10 of the Constitution, which declared, "No state shall ... pass any Bill of Attainder, ex post facto law, or Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts..." Standing at the threshold of the market revolution and the expansion of American capitalism, Fletcher v. Peck insured that property rights and contracts would be protected against the whims of politicians by the full power of the Constitution. Significantly, the opinion also hints at rights rooted "in general principles, which are common to our free institutions," even if not enumerated by the U.S. Constitution. The Marshall Court followed Fletcher with additional rulings that strictly limited the power of states to impair the obligation of contracts: Dartmouth College V. Woodward (1819) and Ogden v. Saunders (1827). Quotes: "That corruption should find its way into the governments of our infant republics, and contaminate the very source of legislation, or that impure motives should contribute to the passage of a law, or the formation of a legislative contract, are circumstances most deeply to be deplored. How far a court of justice would, in any case, be competent, on proceedings instituted by the state itself, to vacate a contract thus formed, and to annul rights required, under that contract, by third persons having no notice of the improper means by which it was obtained, is a question which the court would approach with much circumspection. It may well be doubted how far the validity of a law depends upon the motives of its framers, and how far the particular inducements, operating on members of the supreme sovereign power of a state, to the formation of a contract by that power, are examinable in a court of justice. If the principle be conceded, that an act of the supreme sovereign power might be declared null by a court, in consequence of the means which procured it, still would there be much difficulty in saying to what extent those means much be applied to produce this effect. Must it be direct corruption, or would interest or undue influence of any kind be sufficient? Must the vitiating cause operate on a majority, or on what number of the members? Would the act be null, whatever might be the wish of the nation, or would its obligation or nullity depend upon the public sentiment?" Chief Justice John Marshall, 1810 Fletcher v. Peck opinion "This estate was transferrable; and those who purchased parts of it were not stained by that guilt which infected the original transaction. Their case is not distinguishable from the ordinary case of purchasers of a legal estate without knowledge of any secret fraud, which might have led to the emanation of the original grant. According to the well known course of equity, their rights could not be affected by such fraud. Their situation was the same, their title was the same, with that of every other member of the community who holds land by regular conveyances from the original patentee." Chief Justice John Marshall, 1810 Fletcher v. Peck opinion "It is, then, the unanimous opinion of the court, that, in this case, the estate having passed into the hands of a purchaser for a valuable consideration, without notice, the state of Georgia was restrained, either by general principles which are common to our free institutions, or by the particular provisions of the constitution of the United States, from passing a law whereby the estate of the plaintiff in the premises so purchased could be constitutionally and legally impaired and rendered null and void." Chief Justice John Marshall, 1810 Fletcher v. Peck opinion "I have been very unwilling to proceed to the decision of this cause at all. It appears to me to bear strong evidence, upon the face of it, of being a mere feigned case. It is our duty to decide on the rights, but not on the speculations of parties. My confidence, however, in the respectable gentlemen who have been engaged for the parties, has induced me to abandon my scruples, in the belief that they would never consent to impose a mere feigned case upon this court." Justice William Johnson, Jr., 1810 Fletcher v. Peck concurring opinion Questions to Ponder:
Selected Bibliography: Johnson, John W., ed. Historic U.S. Court Cases: An Encyclopedia. 2d ed. (New York: Routledge, 2001.) Newmyer, R. Kent. John Marshall and the Heroic Age of the Supreme Court. (Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State University Press, 2001.) Smith, Jean Edward. John Marshall: Definer of a Nation. (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1996.) Gateway Links: |
| U.S. v. Hudson/Goodwin
(1812)
Decided by a vote of 6 to 0. Conflict: On May 7, 1806, the Connecticut Currant published allegations by Barzillai Hudson and George Goodwin that President Jefferson and the Congress had secretly voted $2,000,000 to bribe Napoleon Bonaparte so the United States could make a treaty with Spain. The co-defendants were indicted in federal Circuit Court of Connecticut for common law "seditious libel". The Circuit Court was divided on whether it had common law jurisdiction in the case, so it went to the Supreme Court to resolve the issue. Both the United States Attorney General William Pinkney and the defendants' attorney declined to present arguments to the Court. Opinion: Justice William Johnson, Jr. delivered the opinion of a unanimous Supreme Court; Justice Bushrod Washington was absent. The Court ruled that the Circuit Court could not exercise common law jurisdiction in criminal cases such as libel because that power was not delegated under Article III of the Constitution and Congress had passed no act conferring that power to the Circuit Court. This opinion denied the existence of a federal common law of crimes. It asserted, instead, the legal theory that all federal crimes heard in federal courts had to be based on specific statutes rather than judicially discovered in the unwritten common law of the land. Context: In Hudson and Goodwin, the long-standing dispute between Jeffersonian-Republicans and Federalists came to a head over the issue of the Court's jurisdiction in matters of common-law crimes. Up to this time, federal courts had commonly upheld common-law convictions by the lower courts in cases involving crimes against the nation or against federal authorities, such as a violation of treaties or bribing a federal judge or customs officer, or in crimes "subversive of the national government." Crimes prosecuted by the federal courts included seditious libel, participation in the Whiskey Tax Rebellion of 1794, treason, etc. This flew in the face of the Jeffersonian-Republican contention that such oversight exceeded the Court's authority. Jeffersonian-Republicans held that federal courts had no constitutional authority to enforce or create common law crimes, and that such offenses should be tried in the state courts in which the crimes had occurred. This theory held that only the states could administer common law, and that no general common law existed. This difference over the power of the federal courts in common law crime reflected the deep division between the two parties over fundamental principles. The Jeffersonian-Republicans insisted that no branch of government had any power not explicitly granted by the Constitution. The Federalists believed that the Constitution granted implied powers to Congress, the Courts, and the Executive branch to carry out explicitly granted powers. Crime, which fell to the states to handle under the police power of the states, fell out of sight in that it was not specifically identified as within the jurisdiction of the federal courts. Nor was it specifically ruled out, especially in cases when the crime, such as in Hudson and Goodwin, involved actions committed against a federal officer or the nation. The problem stemmed from the fact that neither Congress nor the Constitution had clearly and explicitly articulated the definition of a common-law crime. This dispute, moreover, must be seen in the context of the nation's division of foreign affairs in the late 1790s. In 1797 and 1798, the new nation came close to going to war with France due to French reactions (seizing American merchant vessels that carried British goods) to the Jay Treaty with England. The crisis reached a fever pitch when French officials demanded bribes from American officials, including John Marshall, sent to France to broker a settlement. With the publication of this scandal, known as the XYZ Affair, the Federalists tried to prepare the nation for war by pushing through Congress legislation punishing American citizens for any scandalous and malicious criticisms of American officials. The Jeffersonian-Republicans countered that such legislation was unconstitutional. The Federalists argued that the Sedition Act, which was passed in 1798, addressed a common-law crime that fell within the jurisdiction of the federal courts, on the one hand, and reflected, on the other, the Constitution's "necessary and proper" clause, which empowered Congress to pass laws aimed at protecting the federal government. Jeffersonian-Republicans feared that the Federalist argument in favor of a federal common law of crimes implied that the federal courts had a common-law jurisdiction over all human affairs. If this were allowed to stand, the legislative authority of Congress and the judicial authority of the Supreme Court would incorporate all state authority into the federal government. In the words of James Madison, the doctrine of a federal common law was especially dangerous because it greatly empowered the federal legislative branch over the states: "Congress would therefore be no longer under the limitations, marked out in the constitution. They would be authorized to legislate in all cases whatsoever." Madison and his Jeffersonian supporters also argued that a national common law "would confer on the judicial department a discretion little short of legislative power." By this he meant that the federal judiciary would be empowered to "decide what parts of the common law would, and what would not, be properly applicable to the circumstances of the United States." This would make federal judges into legislators, in Madison's mind. With the ascension of Thomas Jefferson to the presidency, the tide turned in favor of the Jeffersonian perspective. As president, for example, he instructed his attorney general not to prosecute alleged insults to the Spanish government and desecration of the Spanish flag because no statute recognized the offense as a crime Impact/Consequences: Hudson ended the practice of federal courts asserting jurisdiction over offences made criminal under English common law, such as libel, overturning both lower court precedents and accepted wisdom in doing so. It is a landmark case because it required that federal criminal law be formulated in statutes passed by the legislative branch, following constitutional principle, rather than emerge from judicial decisions (like English common law) based in a general sense about the common law of crimes. Additionally, the opinion protected judicial powers reserved to the states from encroachment by judicially-created crimes. Although Chief Justice John Marshall had written in a letter to St. George Tucker in 1800 that the Constitution did not any grant of "jurisdiction in cases at common law," and written in Ex parte Bollman that jurisdiction of federal courts was not regulated by common law, but "written law," it is unclear where he stood in Hudson; however, he did not write a dissent. Quotes: "The legislative authority of the Union must first make an act a crime, affix a punishment to it, and declare the Court that shall have jurisdiction of the offence. Certain implied powers must necessarily result to our Courts of justice from the nature of their institution. But jurisdiction of crimes against the state is not among those powers. To fine for contempt-imprison for contumacy-enforce the observance of order, &c. are powers which cannot be dispensed with in a Court, because they are necessary to the exercise of all others: and so far our Courts no doubt possess powers not immediately derived from statute; but all exercise of criminal jurisdiction in common law cases we are of opinion is not within their implied powers."--Justice William Johnson, Jr., 1812 United States v. Hudson and Goodwin opinion "The nature of the [common law] of England makes it impossible that it should have been adopted in the lump into such a Government as this is; because it was a complete system for the management of all the affairs of a country. It regulated estate, punished all crimes, and, in short, went to all things for which laws are necessary."--Representative Wilson Cary Nicholas, 1798, Congressional Report on the Alien and Sedition Acts. "Whenever an offense aims at the subversion of any Federal institution, or at the corruption of its public officers, it is an offense against the well-being of the United States; from its very nature, it is congnizable under their authority; and, consequently within the jurisdiction of the [federal] court, by virtue of the 11th section of the judicial act."--District Judge Richard Peters, in United States v. Worrall (Pa Circuit Court, 1798). Questions to Ponder:
Selected Bibliography: Johnson, Herbert A. The Chief Justiceship of John Marshall, 1801-1835. (Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 1997.) Levy, Leonard W. Jefferson and Civil Liberties: The Darker Side. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1963.) Rowe, Gary D. "The Sound of Silence: United States v. Hudson & Goodwin, the Jeffersonian Ascendancy and the Abolition of the Federal Common Law of Crimes," 101 Yale Law Journal 919. Smith, Jean Edward. John Marshall: Definer of a Nation. (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1996.) Urofsky, Melvin, and Paul Finkelman, eds. Documents of American Constitutional and Legal History. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002.) Gateway Links: |
| Martin v. Hunter Lessee
(1816)
Decided by a vote of 6 to 0. Conflict: (Article III, Judicial Review; Article VI, Supremacy Clause) Prior to the American Revolution, Thomas Lord Fairfax received 5.2 million acres of land grants in Virginia. During the Revolutionary War, the Virginia legislature seized Loyalists' lands (including those of Lord Fairfax) and subsequently granted patriots (who had served in the war for independence) acreage in honor of their service. One such patriot was David Hunter, who received 800 acres from the old Fairfax grant. Lord Fairfax heirs sued to reclaim the lands, arguing rightful ownership under the terms of the Treaty of Paris (1783), which ended the Revolutionary War, and Jay's Treaty (1795). The case came to the Supreme Court in 1813 (Fairfax Devisee v. Hunter's Lessee), which overturned the Virginia Court of Appeals ruling in favor of Hunter. The Virginia Court of Appeals then refused to obey the Court's decision, and it denied that the Supreme Court had any jurisdiction in the case, claiming that Section 25 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 was unconstitutional. Virginia's stance of defiance brought the case back to the Supreme Court as Martin v. Hunter's Lessee in 1816. Opinion: Justice Joseph Story delivered the Court's opinion; Chief Justice John Marshall recused himself from the case due to conflict of interest (he had invested in Fairfax lands and his brother, James, owned property involved in the litigation). Justice Story asserted that Section 25 of the Judiciary Act of 1789, granted the Supreme Court jurisdiction to review state supreme court decisions that invalidated federal statutes or treaties. The Constitution's grant of concurrent jurisdiction in specified cases did not strip the Supreme Court of its appellate jurisdiction. Story verbally castigated the Virginia court for challenging the Supreme Court's earlier decision. Context: The denial of Lord Fairfax's claims by the Virginia court challenged the constitutionality of the Judiciary Act of 1789, especially section 25. Critics argued that the 1789-law bestowed unconstitutional authority on the federal judiciary. Such federal authority, it was believed, threatened to usurp state power. This perspective believed that the United States was a compact among the states, one in which only limited and enumerated powers were granted to the central government. Virginia most likely saw the Supreme Court's position as part of a Federalist scheme against the state's sovereignty, designed to make the state and its court merely a cog in the national machine. Impact/Consequences: The Supreme Court vigorously and indignantly asserted its appellate jurisdiction over state courts in this case. In doing so, it further advanced the supremacy of the Constitution and insured that there would be uniformity in the American system of law, rather than a patchwork of state interpretations. Story rejected the theory of state sovereignty and the compact interpretation of the government, insisting that the ultimate source of interpreting the Constitution rested with the Supreme Court to avoid governmental chaos and the collapse of the Union. He also indicated that the national government was endowed by the Constitution with certain "implied powers" necessary to effectively carrying out its various charges. Chief Justice John Marshall clearly articulated the implied powers doctrine three years later in McCulloch, v. Maryland (1819). Quotes: "Sec. 25. That a final judgment or decree in any suit, in the highest court of law or equity of a State in which a decision in the suit could be had, where is drawn in question the validity of a treaty or statute of, or an authority exercised under, the United States, and the decision is against their validity; or where is drawn in question the validity of a statute of, or an authority exercised under, any State, on the ground of their being repugnant to the constitution, treaties, or laws of the United States, and the decision is in favour of such their validity, or where is drawn in question the construction of any clause of the constitution, or of a treaty, or statute of, or commission held under, the United States, and the decision is against the title, right, privilege, or exemption, specially set up or claimed by either party, under such clause of the said Constitution, treaty, statute, or commission, may be re-examined, and reversed or affirmed in the Supreme Court of the United States..."--An Act to establish the Judicial Courts of the United States, 1789 "On the whole, the court are of opinion, that the appellate power of the United States does extend to cases pending in the state courts; and that the 25th section of the judiciary act, which authorizes the exercise of this jurisdiction in the specified cases, by a writ of error, is supported by the letter and spirit of the constitution. We find no clause in that instrument which limits this power; and we dare not interpose a limitation where the people have not been disposed to create one." --Justice Joseph Story, 1816 Martin v. Hunter's Lessee opinion "This is assuming a truly alarming latitude of judicial power. Where is it to end? It is an acknowledged principle of, I believe, every court in the world, that not only the decisions, but every thing done under the judicial process of courts, not having jurisdiction, are, ipso facto, void. Are, then, the judgments of this court to be reviewed in every court of the union? and is every recovery of money, every change of property, that has taken place under our process, to be considered as null, void, and tortious? We pretend not to more infallibility than other courts composed of the same frail materials which compose this...But there is one claim which we can with confidence assert in our own name upon those tribunals-the profound, uniform, and unaffected respect which this court has always exhibited for state decisions, give us strong pretensions to judicial comity. And another claim I may assert, in the name of the American people; in this court, every state in the union is represented; we are constituted by the voice of the union, and when decisions take place, which nothing but a spirit to give ground and harmonize can reconcile, ours is the superior claim upon the comity of the state tribunals."--Justice William Johnson, Jr., 1816 Martin v. Hunter's Lessee concurring opinion Questions to Ponder:
Selected Bibliography: Miller, F. Thornton. Juries and Judges versus the Law: Virginia's Provincial Legal Perspective, 1783-1828. (Charlottesville, VA: University Press of Virginia, 1994.) Newmyer, R. Kent. Supreme Court Justice Joseph Story: Statesman of the Old Republic. (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1985.) Smith, Jean Edward. John Marshall: Definer of a Nation. (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1996.) Urofsky, Melvin and Paul Finkelman. A March of Liberty: A Constitutional History of the United States. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002.) Gateway Links: |
| Dartmouth College v. Woodward
(1819)
Decided by a vote of 5 to 1. Conflict: On December 13, 1769, Dartmouth College of Hanover, New Hampshire received its royal charter to educate the "youth of the Indian tribes in this land ... and also English youth and any other" young men in the colony. On June 27, 1816, the New Hampshire state legislature, dominated by Democratic-Republicans, changed Dartmouth's charter without the consent of the college. Immediately, the governor of New Hampshire appointed a new board of trustees and began to transform Dartmouth from a privately funded school to a state university. On February 8, 1817, the old board of trustees sued William H. Woodward, the secretary of Dartmouth, to recover the seal, charter, and other documents necessary to operate the college. They argued that the New Hampshire legislature had unconstitutionally interfered with the charter, which was, they claimed, a contract. The Superior Court of New Hampshire upheld the act of the legislature. The state court reasoned that because the government had chartered the school with a public interest in mind, the charter was not a private contract. The old board of trustees appealed to the United States Supreme Court, represented by attorneys including alumni Daniel Webster. Opinion: Chief Justice John Marshall delivered the opinion at the opening of the new Court term, the first case to be announced in the "Old Supreme Court Chambers" in the basement of the Capitol since the British burned it in 1814. Marshall found for Dartmouth College, stating that it was a private institution with a charter that constituted a contract between the college and the state as the successor to the colonial government that had issued the original charter. Marshall used his opinion to further reinforce the sanctity of contracts under Article I, Section 10 of the U.S. Constitution, expanding protection to charters of private corporations (as Fletcher v. Peck and Martin v. Hunter's Lessee had expanded protection to land grants.) The Chief Justice's opinion was the only one read in the Court that day, although Justices Joseph Story, Bushrod Washington, and William Johnson wrote concurring opinions. Justice Thomas Todd was absent and did not participate. The lone dissenter was Justice Gabriel Duvall, who did not write an explanatory opinion. . Context: Samson Occum, a Mohegan scholar and preacher trained by Reverend Eleazar Wheelock, attracted so many donors, including substantial funds from the Earl of Dartmouth during a fund-raising visit to Great Britain, that the royal governor of New Hampshire issued a charter to create a school for the instruction of Native American students and other colonial youths. Eleazar Wheelock served as president of Dartmouth College until his death in 1807. His son, John Wheelock, succeeded him. Much of the dispute between the new board of trustees and the old board had to do with the changed political climate of the day. Jeffersonian Republicans believed that education should serve the interests of the people as expressed in laws passed by state legislators, who were popularly elected. Dartmouth College's governing procedures appeared to many as a holdover of the old Federalist hierarchy, which seemed beyond the control of the people. The College's internal governing procedures enabled the old board to be a self-perpetuating group. Seen in this context, the decision to remove Dartmouth's royal charter was aimed at eliminating the influence of perhaps the last vestiges of Federalist power in the state. By making Dartmouth into a public rather than a private institution, the legislator believed that they were striking a blow for democracy in battle with property-holding elites. Impact/Consequences: Chief Justice John Marshall believed in the protecting the constitutional right of private property by enforcing the sanctity of contracts. He used Dartmouth College v. Woodward to expand the authority and power of the Constitution's Contract Clause to private corporations, and by extension to business corporations. In declaring that private corporations could not be meddled with by the states that had chartered them, Marshall helped 19th century America's fledgling businesses and industries to grow. This helped clear the way for private businesses and subsequent corporations to operate relatively free of state-imposed constraints. And the principle was amazingly broad. By vesting a corporation with constitutionally protected rights of contract, Marshall's ruling endowed the corporation with basic legal rights even against the government agency or authority that had created it. Later in the century, the Supreme Court would further this endowment by holding that corporations were legally persons protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The decision also had an impact on fostering private educational institutions and charities. As the case was being considered, a remarkable number of schools sent observers to Washington, DC. Justices Johnson and Story each received honorary degrees from both Princeton and Harvard. This decision helped private colleges, endowed by wealthy donors and largely closed to the common people, to continue to flourish in the United States. Private charitable institutions, too, continued to thrive to this day--ranging from the American Red Cross to the Salvation Army USA. This opinion removed from democratic control those business entities formed for the specific purpose of making a profit. In time, as concentrations of corporate wealth grew to gigantic size in the industrial era, Marshall's decision made it nearly impossible for these business organizations to be regulated in the public interest. Without government oversight, many corporations abused their privilege at enormous cost to their competitors, employees, consumers, and taxpayers. Quotes: "KNOW YE, THEREFORE, that We, ... being willing to encourage the laudable and charitable design of spreading Christian knowledge among the savages of our American wilderness, ... do, ... will, ordain, grant and constitute, that there be a college erected in our said province of New Hampshire, by the name of Dartmouth College, for the education and instruction of youth of the Indian tribes in this land, in reading, writing and all parts of learning, which shall appear necessary and expedient, for civilizing and christianizing children of pagans, as well as in all liberal arts and sciences, and also of English youth and any others. And the trustees of said college may and shall be one body corporate and politic, in deed, action and name, and shall be called, named and distinguished by the name of the Trustees of Dartmouth College."--John Wentworth, Royal Governor of New Hampshire on behalf of King George III, December 13, 1769, Dartmouth College Royal Charter "The charter recites, that the founder, on his part, has agreed to establish his seminary in New Hampshire, and to enlarge it, beyond its original design, among other things, for the benefit of that province; and thereupon, a charter is given to him and his associates, designated by himself, promising and assuring to them, under the plighted faith of the state, the right of governing the college, and administering its concerns, in the manner provided in the charter. There is a complete and perfect grant to them of all the power of superintendence, visitation and government. Is not this a contract?" Daniel Webster, attorney for Dartmouth College, March 10-12, 1818, Dartmouth College v. Woodward oral arguments "The education of youth, and the encouragement of the arts and sciences, is one of the most important objects of civil government ... this charter is merely a mode of exercising one of the great powers of civil government. Its amendment, or even repeal, can no more be considered as the breach of a contract, than the amendment or repeal of any other law."--John Holmes, attorney for Woodward, March 10-12, 1818, Dartmouth College v. Woodward oral arguments "Whence, then, can be derived the idea, that Dartmouth College has become a public institution, and its trustees public officers, exercising powers conferred by the public for public objects? Not from the source whence its funds were drawn; for its foundation is purely private ... not from the application of those funds; for money may be given for education, and the persons receiving it do not, by being employed in the education of youth, become members of the civil government ... It is probable, that no man ever was, and that no man ever will be, the founder of a college, believing at the time, that an act of incorporation constitutes no security for the institution; believing, that it is immediately to be deemed a public institution, whose funds are to be governed and applied, not by the will of the donor, but by the will of the legislature."--Chief Justice John Marshall, 1819, Dartmouth College v. Woodward opinion "A corporation is an artificial being, invisible, intangible, and existing only in contemplation of law. Being the mere creature of law, it possesses only those properties which the charter of its creation confers upon it, either expressly, or as incidental to its very existence. These are such as are supposed best calculated to effect the object for which it was created. Among the most important are immortality, and, if the expression may be allowed, individuality; properties, by which a perpetual succession of many persons are considered as the same, and may act as a single individual. They enable a corporation to manage its own affairs, and to hold property...By these means, a perpetual succession of individuals are capable of acting for the promotion of the particular object, like one immortal being. But this being does not share in the civil government of the country, unless that be the purpose for which it was created."--Chief Justice John Marshall, 1819, Dartmouth College v. Woodward opinion Questions to Ponder:
Selected Bibliography: Bowman, R. Scott. The Modern Corporation and American Political Thought: Law, Power, and Ideology. (University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1996.) Friedman, Lawrence and Mark D. MacGarvie. Charity, Philanthropy, and Civility in American History. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003.) Johnson, Timothy R. Oral Arguments and Decisionmaking on the United States Supreme Court. (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2004.) Stites, Francis S. Private Interest and Public Gain: The Dartmouth College Case, 1819. (Amherst, MA: University of Massachusetts Press, 1972.) Newmyer, R. Kent. John Marshall and the Heroic Age of the Supreme Court. (Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State University Press, 2001.) Newmyer, R. Kent. Supreme Court Justice Joseph Story: Statesman of the Old Republic. (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1985.) Smith, Jean Edward. John Marshall: Definer of a Nation. (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1996.) Urofsky, Melvin and Paul Finkelman. A March of Liberty: A Constitutional History of the United States. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002.) Gateway Links: |
| McCulloch v. MD
(1819)
Decided by a vote of 7 to 0.
Conflict: On February 11, 1818, the Maryland legislature passed an act taxing all banks that had not been chartered by Maryland. The act targeted the only bank in the state, which fit the description, the Baltimore branch of the Second Bank of the United States whose charter had been granted by Congress in 1816. When Maryland presented a tax bill for $15,000 to bank cashier James W. McCulloch, he refused to pay. He was taken to court, convicted of violating Maryland's tax law, and fined $2,500. McCulloch turned to the Maryland Court of Appeals, which upheld his conviction. James McCulloch then appealed to the United States Supreme Court. Opinion: Chief Justice John Marshall delivered the opinion of a unanimous Supreme Court. He affirmed that the U.S. Congress had the power to charter a bank. Marshall gave three reasons: 1) The Constitution is a social contract with the people of the United States, thus the supreme law; 2) Congress is bound by the Constitution to act and had the implied right to establish a bank; and 3) Under Article I, Section 8, clause 18 (the Necessary and Proper, or Elastic, Clause), Congress may enact laws unless they are prohibited by the Constitution so long as they are rationally related to an objective, such as creating a bank as part of national economic policy. Marshall further ruled that a state act that attacked federal supremacy, such as Maryland's tax on the bank, was unconstitutional and void. Context: In the years following the War of 1812, the Federalist Party essentially disappeared as a national political party, leaving the Democratic-Republicans in nearly complete control of the government. During this so-called "Era of Good Feelings," American leaders came to agree on issues over which they had been divided for 25 years, including the Bank of the United States. Having defeated the renewal of the original Bank's charter in 1811, Democratic-Republicans struggled to pay for the costs of the war of 1812 with England, and they belatedly realized the value of a national bank in such a national crisis. Thus, in 1816, Congress approved a 20-year charter for the Second Bank of the United States. With $35,000,000 in capital plus deposits made by both the U.S. government and individuals, it was the wealthiest bank in the country. Headquartered in Philadelphia, it had 26 branches nationwide. The U. S. Bank had tremendous power over the national economy for several reasons: (1). Private banks and state-chartered banks printed notes that circulated as currency when they made loans to borrowers. These notes were supposed to be redeemable in specie (gold, silver, British pounds, Spanish dollars, etc.), but most banks issued more notes than they had specie reserves, assuming that not all notes would come in for redemption at the same time. Holders of these private bank notes usually exchanged them for U. S. bank notes; as a result the Bank of the U.S. held large amounts of these private note and could redeem them all at once and bankrupt any bank in the nation that had over extended itself. (2). Because federal funds (receipts from tariffs, taxes, and land sales) were deposited in the U. S. Bank, it had a tremendous competitive advantage over other banks in attracting deposits and customers seeking loans. (3). It could offer loans at much lower, or higher, interest rates or dump its holdings of private bank notes into the economy, with no control over its policies exercised by any elected official. As a result, private and state banks resented the U. S. Bank's ability in theory to demand "hard money," felt that some branch operators were corrupt, and feared the Bank's size and competitiveness. States were nervous, too, about the financial clout of the federal government. And many average citizens, who hated all banks and the power that banks had over their lives, especially resented the Bank of the United States as an anti-democratic, evil institution. For many years, the Bank's ability to demand payment in specie had helped prevent local banks from printing worthless notes. This meant, however, that people buying western land had difficulty getting cash for loans. After the War of 1812, many people wanted to buy land in the South and West, especially to plant cotton. There was a huge demand for money and land, and prices rose. During this land frenzy, the Second Bank of the U.S. failed to demand specie payments, so many private and state banks overextended themselves by making unwise loans and printing more notes than they could back with "hard money." Some western branches of the Bank of the U.S. itself also printed too much money and made less than safe loans. While this "cheap-money" or "soft money" approach of just printing cash not backed by specie was popular with farmers, debtors, and land speculators, it helped fuel inflation, which worried creditors fearful of being paid back in money worth less than they had loaned out.. In 1818, to prevent financial collapse due to the over-expansion of the economy, the Second Bank of the United States cut back on printing money and making loans, and then began to call in the notes of private banks, demanding payment in gold and silver. The Bank had saved itself from financial hardship, but many private and state banks were ruined. To meet the Bank's demands, these smaller banks scrambled for money calling in every loan they could. Many indebted and over-extended farmers found themselves unable to pay their bank loans, and tens of thousands of small farmers lost their lands and savings as the nation's economy plunged into a state of economic depression. The banking industry nearly collapsed in the Panic of 1819, and only the most conservative banks managed to ride out the crisis. Nearly everyone blamed the Bank of the United States for the crisis. Senator Thomas Hart Benton of Missouri nicknamed the Second Bank of the U.S., "The Monster," a feeling shared by the vast majority of Americans. By 1818, the Bank was so hated that private and state banks went on the attack. Responding to popular demand, across the nation, state legislatures (including Maryland) enacted laws to restrict the Bank. Impact/Consequences: The scope and breadth of Chief Justice John Marshall's opinion in McCulloch v. Maryland make it one of the most important cases, if not the most important decision, pronounced in the history of the United States Supreme Court. Marshall probed the formation and nature the Union, the balance of state sovereignty and national power in a federal republic, and principles for interpreting the Constitution. At the time the opinion was reviled in newspapers because it sustained the Bank of the United States and because sectionalism and support for the doctrine of states rights were increasing. Criticism was so intense by Spencer Roane, writing as "Amphictyon," that Chief Justice Marshall anonymously published responses under the signature "A Friend to the Union." McCulloch emphatically states that the Constitution derives its authority from the social contract, the will of "We, the People" expressed in the ratification process. That authority gives the Constitution supremacy over state constitutions and laws. Marshall's opinion continued to consolidate, in a legal sense, the alliance of "united states" into the federal union of the "United States of America." Judicial nationalism increased at the same time as sectionalism increased, which ultimately plunged the nation into the Civil War. When Lincoln faced the great national crisis of Civil War, he had Marshall's body of opinions serving as a legal bulwark to sustain the Union. (In the wake of the Civil War, average Americans finally appreciated John Marshall's nationalist opinions, if belatedly.) In McCulloch, Marshall discussed the differences between "strict construction"--a literal reading of the Constitution--and "loose construction"--which allows justices to infer meaning through reason and logic beyond the actual words. He then offered a Hamiltonian "loose construction" of Article I, Section 8, clause 18, the Necessary and Proper Clause, saying that it granted Congress great flexibility to carry out its constitutional duties. In doing so, Marshall transformed a vague constitutional phrase into the immensely powerful Elastic Clause. The men who drafted the Constitution in 1787 no doubt would have been astonished that this phrase would enable Congress to support the construction of the transcontinental railroad, Tennessee Valley Authority, and NASA--as well as establish the Federal Reserve System, the successor to the Bank of the United States. Perhaps Marshall would be amazed as well, but it was his vision, described in McCulloch v. Maryland, which made it all constitutionally possible. Quotes: "The Congress shall have power: 18. To make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof."--The United States Constitution, Article I, Section 8, 1787 "Nothing can be plainer than that, if the law of congress, establishing the bank, be a constitutional act, it must have its full and complete effects. Its operation cannot be either defeated or impeded by acts of state legislation. To hold otherwise, would be to declare, that congress can only exercise its constitutional powers, subject to the controlling discretion, and under the sufferance, of the state governments."--Daniel Webster, attorney for James W. McCulloch, 1819 McCulloch v. Maryland, oral arguments "It is insisted, that the constitution was formed and adopted, not by the people of the United States at large, but by the people of the respective states. To suppose, that the mere proposition of this fundamental law threw the American people into one aggregate mass, would be to assume what the instrument itself does not profess to establish. It is, therefore, a compact between the states, and all the powers which are not expressly relinquished by it, are reserved to the states."--Walter Jones, attorney for Maryland, 1819, McCulloch v. Maryland oral arguments "To the formation of a league, such as was the confederation, the state sovereignties were certainly competent. But when, 'in order to form a more perfect union,' it was deemed necessary to change this alliance into an effective government, possessing great and sovereign powers, and acting directly on the people, the necessity of referring it to the people, and of deriving its powers directly from them, was felt and acknowledged by all. The government of the Union, then ... is, emphatically and truly, a government of the people. In form, and in substance, it emanates from them. Its powers are granted by them, and are to be exercised directly on them, and for their benefit."--Chief Justice John Marshall, 1819, McCulloch v. Maryland opinion "The government of the United States, then, though limited in its powers, is supreme; and its laws, when made in pursuance of the constitution, form the supreme law of the land, 'anything in the constitution or laws of any state to the contrary notwithstanding.'"--Chief Justice John Marshall, 1819, McCulloch v. Maryland opinion "We admit, as all must admit, that the powers of the government are limited, and that its limits are not to be transcended. But we think the sound construction of the constitution must allow to the national legislature that discretion, with respect to the means by which the powers it confers are to be carried into execution, which will enable that body to perform the high duties assigned to it, in the manner most beneficial to the people. Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of the constitution, are constitutional."--Chief Justice John Marshall, 1819, McCulloch v. Maryland opinion "That the power to tax involves the power to destroy; that the power to destroy may defeat and render useless the power to create... the states have no power, by taxation or otherwise, to retard, impede, burden, or in any manner control, the operations of the constitutional laws enacted by congress to carry into execution the powers vested in the general government. This is, we think, the unavoidable consequence of that supremacy which the constitution has declared. We are unanimously of opinion, that the law passed by the legislature of Maryland, imposing a tax on the Bank of the United States, is unconstitutional and void."--Chief Justice John Marshall, 1819, McCulloch v. Maryland opinion Questions to Ponder:
Selected Bibliography: Gunther, Gerald, ed. John Marshall's Defense of McCulloch v. Maryland. (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1969.) Johnson, Herbert A. The Chief Justiceship of John Marshall, 1801-1835. (Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 1997.) Newmyer, R. Kent. John Marshall and the Heroic Age of the Supreme Court. (Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State University Press, 2001.) Rimini, Robert V. Daniel Webster: The Man and His Time. (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., Inc., 1997.) Smith, Jean Edward. John Marshall: Definer of a Nation. (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1996.) Urofsky, Melvin and Paul Finkelman. A March of Liberty: A Constitutional History of the United States. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002.) Gateway Links: |
| Gibbons v. Ogden
(1824)
Decided by a vote of 7 to 0. Conflict: In 1808, the New York State legislature granted a 30-year monopoly to operate steamships in New York waterways to Robert Fulton (inventor of the steamboat Clermont) and Robert Livingston; they licensed Aaron Ogden (formerly a U.S. Senator and Governor of New Jersey) to operate their business. Thomas Gibbons, Ogden's former business partner, applied for and received a ferry license under the Federal Coasting Act of 1793. Gibbons then began to run his steamboats, the Stoudinger and Bellona between New Jersey and New York, without permission from New York. Ogden obtained a New York court injunction to stop Gibbons from operating his steamboats. Gibbons appealed to the Supreme Court, hiring Daniel Webster and Attorney General William Wirt to argue his case. He left $40,000 in his will to carry on the fight if he died, and he even challenged Ogden to a duel. (Ogden sensibly refused, sued Gibbons for trespassing on his property, and received a $5,000 judgment.) Opinion: Chief Justice John Marshall delivered the opinion of a unanimous Supreme Court. He struck down the New York legislature's monopoly grant and broadly interpreted the nature and scope of Congressional power under the Constitution's Commerce Clause. He held that Gibbon's federal license nullified New York's grant of monopoly to Fulton/Livingston/Ogden. He rejected the idea that commerce was merely "traffic" or exchange, but considered it broadly to include all forms of business activity. While states had the right to regulate trade within state borders, the Constitution had enumerated the power of Congress to regulate interstate and foreign commerce and states could not interfere with authority derived from the supreme law of the land. Context: Around 1793, inventor Robert Fulton began to think of adapting the steam engine to propel boats. Robert Livingston (member of the committee which drafted the Declaration of Independence and a diplomat who helped negotiate the Louisiana Purchase) was also tinkering with the idea of a steamboat, and had succeeded in convincing the New York legislature to grant him a 20-year monopoly for operating a vessel that would travel at four miles per hour. In 1803, Fulton and Livingston met in France and built a boat, which sank. They improved their prototype and returned to the United States. On August 17, 1807, Fulton's steamboat Clermont embarked up the Hudson River for Albany, New York. The trip took 32 hours (meeting the legislature's four mile-per-hour requirement) and created a revolution in transportation. Soon the rivers, coasts, lakes, and bays of the nation were filled with steamboats. New York awarded Fulton and Livingston their monopoly, but the neighboring states of New Jersey and Connecticut retaliated by awarding their own monopolies. Because many state boundaries were defined by water, this created competing monopolies between the states. Impact/Consequences: Gibbons v. Ogden, like Dartmouth College v. Woodward, took place at a critical juncture in the economic life of the republic. At a time of increasing industrialization and business activity, this opinion helped the United States move from the old European economic model of state monopolies towards the free market capitalist system espoused by Adam Smith. It also gave the federal government, through Congress, increasing power to formulate coherent national economic policy and regulate economic activity. All regulatory law at the federal level, from navigation to the Internet, springs from Marshall's expansive interpretation of the Commerce Clause in this case. Of all Marshall's landmark opinions, this one may have been the most popular with the American public of his time. Gibbons v. Ogden was a blow to monopolies, which were despised, and an affirmation of Adam Smith's popular free market ideology. The decision also helped to keep U.S. law abreast of technology; most Americans viewed technology as the key to prosperity and were glad that the Court's view was so progressive. Gibbons and Ogden were so preoccupied with their litigation that the operator of the Bellona, Cornelius Vanderbilt, emerged as the long-term winner in the steamboat business, eventually amassing one of the greatest personal fortunes in U.S. history through steamboats and railroads. Marshall's ruling in Gibbons affirmed the power of the federal government over commerce, saying that any state law interfering with federal legislation in commerce between the states could not stand. He added, however, that internal commerce within a state fell completely under state authority. And he left open the issue of whether states could legislate in areas not regulated by Congress. Thomas Jefferson attacked Marshall's decision as another step in the "usurpation of all the rights reserved to the states." Southern slaveholders also objected, fearing that Congress might use its power to regulate interstate commerce to regulate the slave trade and even the production and sale of cotton, both of which were aspects of interstate commerce. Neither the Marshall Court, however, nor its successor Court under Chief Justice Roger B. Taney ever asserted this power to regulate the commerce of cotton and slavery. Quotes: "The Congress shall have power: To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes."--United States Constitution, Article I, Section 3 "...the States do not derive their independence and sovereignty from the grant or concession of the British crown, but from their own act in the declaration of independence. By this act, they became 'free and independent States,' and as such, 'have full power to levy war, conclude peace, contract alliances, establish commerce, and to do all other acts and things which independent States may of right do.' The State of New- York, having thus become sovereign and independent, formed a constitution, by which the 'supreme legislative power' was vested in its Legislature: and there are no restrictions on that power, which in any manner relate to the present controversy. On the other hand, the constitution of the United States is one of limited and expressly delegated powers, which can only be exercised as granted, or in the cases enumerated."--Thomas Oakley, attorney for Aaron Ogden, 1824 Gibbons v. Ogden, oral arguments "For, if the state of things which has already commenced is to go on; if the spirit of hostility, which already exists in three of our States, is to catch by contagion, and spread among the rest, as, from the progress of the human passions, and the unavoidable conflict of interests, it will too surely do, what are we to expect? Civil wars have often arisen from far inferior causes, and have desolated some of the fairest provinces of the earth."--Attorney General William Wirt, attorney for Thomas Gibbons, 1824 Gibbons v. Ogden oral arguments. "This instrument contains an enumeration of powers expressly granted by the people to their government. It has been said, that these powers ought to be construed strictly. But why ought they to be so construed? Is there one sentence in the constitution which gives countenance to this rule? In the last of the enumerated powers, that which grants, expressly, the means for carrying all others into execution, Congress is authorized 'to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper' for the purpose."--Chief Justice John Marshall, 1824, Gibbons v. Ogden opinion "Commerce, undoubtedly, is traffic, but it is something more: it is intercourse. It describes the commercial intercourse between nations, and parts of nations, in all its branches, and is regulated by prescribing rules for carrying on that intercourse. The mind can scarcely conceive a system for regulating commerce between nations, which shall exclude all laws concerning navigation, which shall be silent on the admission of the vessels of the one nation into the ports of the other, and be confined to prescribing rules for the conduct of individuals, in the actual employment of buying and selling, or of barter."--Chief Justice John Marshall, 1824, Gibbons v. Ogden opinion "We are now arrived at the inquiry-What is this power? It is the power to regulate; that is, to prescribe the rule by which commerce is to be governed. This power, like all others vested in Congress, is complete in itself, may be exercised to its utmost extent, and acknowledges no limitations, other than are prescribed in the constitution... If, as has always been understood, the sovereignty of Congress, though limited to specified objects, is plenary as to those objects, the power over commerce with foreign nations, and among the several States, is vested in Congress as absolutely as it would be in a single government, having in its constitution the same restrictions on the exercise of the power as are found in the constitution of the United States. The wisdom and the discretion of Congress, their identity with the people, and the influence which their constituents possess at elections, are, in this, as in many other instances, as that, for example, of declaring war, the sole restraints on which they have relied, to secure them from its abuse. They are the restraints on which the people must often they solely, in all representative governments."--Chief Justice John Marshall, 1824, Gibbons v. Ogden opinion "Powerful and ingenious minds, taking, as postulates, that the powers expressly granted to the government of the Union, are to be contracted by construction, into the narrowest possible compass, and that the original powers of the States are retained, if any possible construction will retain them, may, by a course of well digested, but refined and metaphysical reasoning, founded on these premises, explain away the constitution of our country, and leave it, a magnificent structure, indeed, to look at, but totally unfit for use."--Chief Justice John Marshall, 1824, Gibbons v. Ogden opinion Questions to Ponder:
Selected Bibliography: Baxter, Maurice G. The Steamboat Monopoly: Gibbons v. Ogden, 1824. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1972.) Johnson, Herbert A. The Chief Justiceship of John Marshall, 1801-1835. (Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 1997.) Newmyer, R. Kent. John Marshall and the Heroic Age of the Supreme Court. (Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State University Press, 2001.) Rimini, Robert V. Daniel Webster: The Man and His Time. (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., Inc., 1997.) Schwartz, Bernard. A History of the Supreme Court. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993.) Smith, Jean Edward. John Marshall: Definer of a Nation. (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1996.) Urofsky, Melvin, and Paul Finkelman, eds. Documents of American Constitutional and Legal History. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002.) Wiecek, William M. Liberty Under Law: The Supreme Court in American Life. (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 1988.) Gateway Links: |