Time Line: The Court and Gender
Women are not mentioned in the United States Constitution. There were no Founding Mothers; it probably would not have occurred to many members of the Constitutional Convention that women should have been represented, either among them or in the document they drafted. For the first 150 years of American history, women were treated in law as fundamentally different from, and inferior to, men. They did not even receive the right to vote until 1920. It was not until the 1830s that the Court heard a significant case about the rights of women, and the first female associate Justice was not seated until 1981--almost exactly 190 years after the Court was first convened. Women have fought with courage and perseverance to be equal before the law, and they have achieved much as a result of their struggles. Over the years, the Supreme Court both hampered and assisted women in their struggle for equal rights; and the battle before the Court is far from over.
| US Events |
| Gender Events |
| Date |
| President |
| Court |
| Marriage and Family |
| Employment and Careers |
| Civic and Social Rights |
| Reproduction and Privacy Rights |
| Sexual Harassment and Violence |
| Educational Policies |
| Morality and Sexual Ethics |
| Sexual Orientation and Other |
| Date |
· State Constitution
· Former slave Lucy Terry Prince wins Supreme Court case
| Wallingsford v. Allen
[1836] Decided by a vote of 6 to 0. The Court maintained that when a husband gives property to his estranged wife as court-ordered alimony, the woman, although still married, is able to use such property for her own needs. In this case, Wallingsford's wife received an enslaved woman, whom she freed. The husband sued to have the African-American woman (Allen) re-enslaved and returned to him as his rightful property. The Court decided in his wife's favor. |
| Stein v. Bowman
[1839] Decided by a vote 6 to 0. A wife cannot be forced to testify, or give evidence, against her husband. To allow this to happen would "break down or impair the great principles which protect the sanctities of husband and wife," destroying thereby "the best solace of human existence." The one exception is when the "husband commits an offense against the person of his wife." |
| Agricultural Bank of Mississippi v. Rice
[1846] Decided by a vote 6 to 0. A wife cannot be forced to testify, or give evidence, against her husband. To allow this to happen would "break down or impair the great principles which protect the sanctities of husband and wife," destroying thereby "the best solace of human existence." The one exception is when the "husband commits an offense against the person of his wife." |
| Bein v. Heath
[1848] Decided by a vote of 6 to 0. Under Louisiana law, a wife can sell or borrow money using her property as security, which she owns separate from her husband. In this case, the wife claimed that the money was then loaned to her husband, who became insolvent. Court maintained that the holder of the mortgage may seize the woman's separate property because she committed fraud in borrowing the money to be used for her husband, which is against the law of the state of Louisiana. |
| Barber v. Barber
[1858] Decided by a vote of 6 to 0. A woman legally separated from her husband has the right to sue her husband for the collection of legal alimony in courts of equity as long as a "next best friend" (usually a male but not always depending on the state) files the suit. The suit cannot be filed directly by her in a court of law but must be filed in a court of equity because as a feme covert she is "deemed to be under the protection of her husband," and can sue him, or anyone, only with his consent. She can file this suit even if she lives in a different state from her husband. |
| Drury v. Roster
[1864] Decided by a vote of 6 to 0. Court upholds a Minnesota decree declaring a mortgage given by a married woman to be null and void. Common law and statute do not allow, moreover, a married woman to authorize an agent to act for her with power of attorney. States that these "disabilities" are for the protection of married women because of their " dependent condition" and to "guard her against undue influence and restraint." |
| Voorhees v. Bonesteel
[1872] Court decided that a married woman may hold property in her name as an estate separate from her husband, and that his debts cannot be levied against property that she owns and manages separately from her husband. This decision upheld the growing trend of states to pass Married Women's Property Acts allowing for separate estates. |
| Lynde v. Lynde
[1900] Court held that divorce judgments from one state could be enforced in another state, with the enforcing state referring to local statutes and practices. This case involves a husband moving out of state to avoid responsibility for former family and the decision, based on the “full faith and credit” clause of the Constitution, involved no federal question. Gateway Links: |
| Thompson v. Thompson
[1900] Court upheld the ruling of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, which had ruled that a wife did not have the right to sue for damages for assault upon her person by her husband. Included is a lengthy dissenting opinion by Justices Harlan, Holmes, and Hughes. Gateway Links: |
| Serra v. Mortiga
[1907] Court struck down the decision of the territorial courts of the Philippines. The Filipino penal code under which this adultery case was reviewed did not meet the standard set by the U.S. Constitution and Bill of Rights. Gateway Links: |
| Bennett v. Bennett
[1908] Court held the discretionary powers of the Oklahoma Territory to act on behalf of a woman filing for divorce, to be awarded temporary alimony and attorney fees until a final divorce settlement. Involves the efforts of the husband to hide assets and ignore court decrees. Gateway Links: |
| Thompson v. Thompson
[1913] Court held that a wife's appeal against a Virginia State divorce decree cannot be made in the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, based on the "full faith and credit" clause. At issue is the amount of money required, $5000 or more, to appeal under Virginia jurisdiction. Gateway Links: |
| Mackenzie v. Hare
[1915] Court upheld the ruling of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, which had ruled that a wife did not have the right to sue for damages for assault upon her person by her husband. Included is a lengthy dissenting opinion by Justices Harlan, Holmes, and Hughes. Gateway Links: |
| Chung Fook v. White
[1924] Court affirmed the lower court's rule that denied immigration into the nation of the alien wife of a native-born citizen of the United States, under the Immigration Act of 1917, which allowed for exemptions only to the wife of a person who was a naturalized citizen. The case reflects a heightened anti-Chinese sentiment as the Court critiques the law for a lack of clarity, but claims that the remedy is through state legislation, not the Supreme Court. Gateway Links: |
| Yarborough v.Yarborough
[1933] Sadie Yarborough, sixteen years of age, in 1930, through her grandfather R. D. Bowers, sues her father, W. A. Yarborough, in a South Carolina Court seeking financial support for her education. Yarbrough claims he paid the support dictated by the Georgia court when he divorced Sadie's mother in that state. The majority opinion, given by Louis Brandies, ruled for the father citing the full faith and credit defense (one state must honor the decisions of another, Article 4.1 U. S. Constitution). Those in dissent fought for an exception stating that each state has a right to determine the necessary protection and support of minors. |
| U.S. ex rel Knauff v. Shaughnessy
[1950] he Court, in an opinion by Sherman Minton, upheld the government's right, based on security concerns, to deny entry to a war bride without giving the reasons. The majority argued, despite the War Bride Act of 1945, Congress has the right to restrict entry, as it is a privilege not a right. Those in dissent argued that withholding "evidence of guilt ... is abhorrent to free men" and suggested the case against the war bride be aired. Gateway Links: |
| King v. Smith
[1968] Mrs. Sylvester Smith found herself denied Social Security payments from the Aid to Families With Dependent Children Program (AFDC) because of an on-going relationship with a man other than her four children's father. This disqualified her under Alabama's "substitute father" provision. The Court decided this rule violated federal requirements in that children cannot be denied benefits due to a parent's behavior. They granted Alabama's right to deal with actions it deemed "immoral," but added, state officials needed to find a different way. Gateway Links: |
| Glona v. American Guarantee
[1968] A domestic worker, residing in Texas, sought damages for the death of her illegitimate son, who was involved in an automobile accident. Louisiana law denied unmarried persons the right to file wrongful death suits unless, previous to the demise, they filed formal acknowledgment of paternity. William Douglas, writing for the majority, found the statue inconsistent in regards to who might file an action and the assertion it prevented the "sin" of illegitimacy baseless. For these reasons, the Court ruled the law violated the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth amendment. Those in dissent found the law aligned with states' right to dictate legal requirements for such suits. They claimed the majority based their decision on a biological foundation instead of a legal one. Gateway Links: |
| Reed v. Reed
(1971)
Decided by a vote of 7 to 0, two seats (to be occupied by Rehnquist and Powell) were vacant.
Conflict:
The court was following the rules as defined by state statute. The statute set forth which relatives could be executors and in what order they were to be appointed. First, a surviving spouse was to be appointed; if there was not a spouse, then children of the deceased were next in line, followed by the father or mother of the deceased. The statute stated that if there were two people at the same level--as in this case, a mother and a father--the man must be appointed. Opinion:
When a law makes a distinction based upon gender, that law must be viewed with suspicion. In this case, the distinction in the law had to have a "rational relationship" to the purpose of the law. Under the rational relationship test a law is presumed to be constitutional unless proven otherwise. When a state makes a law that differentiates among a class of people it has to have a rational reason to justify its choices. In this case, the Court stated that there was no reason to make a distinction among men and women. Idaho had no rational reason to automatically appoint Cecil instead of Sally. Context:
Before Reed (1971), courts routinely allowed discrimination based upon gender. Laws that limited women from working at night, or as a bartender were upheld. These laws were seen as valid exercises of a state's police powers. A state may make laws that affect the health, safety and welfare of the public. In Muller v. Oregon the Court said that a women's health was an "object of public interest" and thus, it was constitutional for Oregon to limit a woman's right to contract regarding the number of hours she worked per day even though such a restriction was not constitutional for men. Since Reed, various courts looked at such laws and applied the heightened scrutiny test with mixed results. Laws, such as women working as bartenders, were struck down as archaic and showed an out-dated view of women in the workforce. On the other hand, women were not allowed to be prison guards in an all-male facility that housed some sex offenders. There were cases in which women and men benefited from the Court's new outlook. Men had to be admitted to an all-female nursing school, and women were to be admitted to the all-male Virginia Military Institute (VMI). As an attorney, Ruth Bader Ginsburg argued the Reed case before the Supreme Court. In subsequent cases she argued that gender, like race, should be reviewed with the strict scrutiny test. As a Supreme Court Justice she wrote the opinion in the VMI case. Impact/Consequences:
There is still the ongoing concern about Title VII because of the opportunity to limit some jobs to women under a Bona Fide Occupation Qualification (BFOQ). This exception allows limitations of some jobs if there is BFOQ that limits consideration of all women for a specific job. However, a woman cannot be automatically denied job opportunities because of a preconceived notion by the employer that a job is too dangerous for women as a group, or that women as a group are too weak to perform a job. Quotes:
"We ask justice, we ask equality, we ask that all civil and political rights that belong to the citizens of the United States be guaranteed to us and our daughters forever."
"Rail as they will about 'discrimination,' women are simply not endowed by nature with the same measures of single-minded ambition and the will to succeed in the fiercely competitive world of Western capitalism."
Questions to Ponder:
Can you think of any jobs that women as a group should be excluded from? How about jobs that men cannot do just because they are men? Should pregnant women be exempt from some job duties? Who gets to decide what jobs a pregnant woman can and can not do? Are there jobs that should be limited based upon one's sexual orientation? How about military service? Men are required to register for the draft at the age of 18. Should women also be required to register for the draft? What views on women's roles and men's roles in society reinforce your decisions about who should serve in the military? Selected Bibliography:
Maschke, Karen J. Litigation, Courts, and Women Workers. New York: Praeger, 1989. Gateway Links: |
| Miller v. Albright
[1998] Decided by a vote of 6 to 3. The Supreme Court decided that a child born outside the United States is not a United States citizen if only the Father is a U.S. citizen; if the mother is a U.S. citizen, than the child is a legal U.S. citizen. Gateway Links: |
| Nguyen v. INS
[2001] Decided by a vote of 5 to 4. The Supreme Court by a narrow vote affirmed two lower court decisions to legalize partial birth abortions. Gateway Links: |
| Muller v. OR
(1908)
Decided by vote of 9 to 0
Conflict:
The Constitutional issue in Muller relates to the right under the Fourteenth Amendment to liberty. The Fourteenth Amendment sets forth that states shall make no laws that limit a person's right to liberty. The Court held in Lochner v. New York that liberty included the right to contract for one's labor without government interference. Thus, New York could not make a law limiting the number of hours men are allowed to work each week. In addition to the Constitutional argument was the issue of women's ability to work. The State of Oregon argued that women were weaker than men and the State could legislate on their behalf to protect them against the harsher aspects of industrialism. In opposition, the employer argued that women, just like men, could negotiate their own terms of employment. Opinion:
Muller's argument centered on the right of individuals to contract for labor, without government interference, contending that if a worker did not want the job at the hours offered, he or she could refuse to work. He argued, too, that a state law that limited women but not men from freely making their contracts did not treat women equally to men. Muller argued that Oregon had overstepped its police power authority because the job at issue posed no danger to the public. On behalf of the State of Oregon Louis D. Brandeis (a future Supreme Court Justice) filed an extensive brief that mainly focused not on the Constitutionality of the state statute, but on the negative impact of strenuous industrial work on women as a group. He extended his idea about women's safety to the safety of the public. He asserted that because women were physically different than men (in that they were not as strong, they bore and raised children, and they were responsible for the home), they needed special treatment under the law. Oregon could legislate away a woman's right to contract for the benefit of the public good. The Court wholeheartedly agreed with Mr. Brandeis exclaiming that "healthy mothers were essential to vigorous offspring," and that the "physical well-being of women becomes an object of public interest and care in order to preserve the strength and vigor of the race." The Court said that the welfare of women and the public were in danger of unscrupulous employers. The Court stated that it was a fact of common knowledge that women were dependent on men for their well-being and health. Women were not on equal footing with men when it came to negotiating the terms of their employment. Oregon had a right to take note of the differences between men and women and legislate to protect women. Context:
. When the lawyer Louis D. Brandeis presented his argument before the Court he used a creative strategy never really employed before, one that relied on a massive amount of social evidence gathered by the Consumers League, an organization that had pushed hard for protective laws for women. This data, consisting of nearly every medical and government report on the effect of industrial work on the health of women, also included 95 pages of quotations on the topic from experts all over the industrial world. The "Brandeis brief" in Muller became the model that reformers began to use in defending reform legislation aimed at protecting individuals and groups of people harmed by social conditions and practices. The most celebrated example of this model was in Brown v. Board of Education (1954), which struck down segregation in public schools. Impact/Consequences:
Muller served future arguments in creating minimum work hours and wages for men and women. But in doing so it influenced the political and social debate about what work was appropriate for women. Almost 40 years later in United States v. Darby Lumber Company (1941) the Court conceded that men would also benefit from laws that required minimum wages and limited maximum hours. It held that there were social harms in overworking and underpaying all employees. In this decision the right of employees, regardless of sex, to use the authority of law to limit employers power over them as workers was affirmed. In Muller, the Court noted that a woman was in a "class by herself." Although the Court carved out an exception for women regarding appropriate work conditions, it did not see the need to consider women as a "suspect class" when defining rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. (A suspect classification is discrimination based on what the Court has declared to be irrational and constitutionally invalid.) Under the Fourteenth Amendment, laws that impact people as a race are seen as "suspect" and states are required to show that there is a "compelling state interest" in creating the law and that the law was written in the least restrictive way possible to achieve that interest. Laws that discriminate on the basis of age, for example, are not suspect in and of themselves in the eyes of the Court. Arguments to the Court that women, too, should be viewed as a "suspect" class have not been persuasive. The Court has determined that the restrictive laws that treat women and men differently need not only pass a "heightened scrutiny" test. The test requires that the state must explain why the law serves an "important government objective" and that the law must be "substantially related" to those objectives. At first the Court saw hour limitations differently than requirements regarding minimum wages. In Adkins v. Children's Hospital (1923), a federal minimum wage for women was held unconstitutional. Adkins was overturned by West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish (1937), in which the Court held that a state law could set minimum wages for women and minors. Quotes:
"Women are the only exploited group in history to have been idealized into powerlessness."
"We submit that in view of the facts set forth and of legislative action extending over a period of more than sixty years in the leading countries of Europe, and in twenty in our states, it cannot be said that the Legislature of Oregon had no reasonable ground for believing that the public health, safety, or welfare did not require a legal limitation on women's work in manufacturing and mechanical establishments and laundries to ten hours in one day."
"Thus, the majority opinion did not really have to consider the individual working woman involved in the case or other American women in terms of either their working conditions or their performances on the job. Instead, the Court was encouraged to concentrate on female physical weaknesses compared to males and their procreative functions."
Questions to Ponder:
Should pregnant women receive extra time off from work after giving birth? What about fathers--should fathers also get to take off time from work for the new parenting responsibilities? Are laws that provide women the right to take off time from work for pregnancy treating women as a group of people who need protection or are these laws creating a level playing field by taking into consideration the reality of the fact that it is women who get pregnant? Consider that the Muller Court thought it was doing the right thing when it said women as a sex are different than men and because of that difference they should not have to work as hard as men. Isn't this basically the same thing as saying that because women as a sex are different than men, they are not allowed to work in the same jobs for the same pay as men? If the Fourteenth Amendment does not extend equal rights to women, should there be an Equal Rights Amendment (ERA) that does guarantee women equal rights? If an ERA were passed would the courts then interpret that Amendment like the Fourteenth Amendment and require that state laws treat women and men equally--just like the Fourteenth Amendment requires the courts to treat people of different races the same? Is there a valid reason to deny, not just one particular job to a woman candidate, but also to deny a job to women as a group? How about to limiting jobs to women because they are also mothers? How do ideas about women's proper place in society impact ideas about procreation? If women's health concerns are a matter of public concern as stated in Muller, than does the public have a right to say if a woman should carry a pregnancy to term? The Court later created rights for couples to use birth control and a woman the right to an abortion under the right to privacy--a right not specifically mentioned in the Constitution. Should states be able to put limits on these rights? What kind of limits? What do you think about the idea that protective legislation of the sort that limits working hours for women but not for men actually hurt many working-class women in the sense that they could not earn enough money to support themselves. In other words, did this gender-biased legislation harm working class women more than it helped them? Selected Bibliography: Freison, Jennifer and Ronald K. L. Collins. "Looking Back on Muller v. Oregon." American Bar Association Journal 69 (March-April 1983): 294-98, 472-77. Kessler-Harris, Alice. Out to Work: A History of Wage-Earning Women in the United States. New York: Oxford University Press, 1982. McCall, Leslie. Complex Inequality: Gender, Race and Class in the New Economy. New York: Routledge, 2001. Gateway Links: |
| Quong Wing v. Kirkendall
[1912] Court held judgment of the Supreme Court of Montana, which argued that variations of taxation based on gender did not deprive plaintiff of 14th Amendment rights, but protected women in their effort to earn a living. The dissenting opinion reflects race attitudes of the era and an inconsistent tax code. Gateway Links: |
| Miller v. Wilson
[1915] Court affirmed the California State act prohibiting employers, in certain professions, from requiring women to work more than 8 hours in a 24-hour period or 48 hours in a week. The act excluded many classes of employment: agricultural, canning industries, stenographers, clerks, and domestic servants. The criteria for classification are based on the nature of the employer's business, not the "character" of the employees' work. Gateway Links: |
| Adkins v. Children's Hospital
[1923] Court held that wage regulation was unconstitutional, in a lengthy opinion that outlines the development of work-related legislation and the role of women in the workforce. The decision limits the Police Power of the state to regulate maximum work hours but not wages and reflects upon the "revolutionary changes" brought about by the passing of the 19th Amendment. Two dissenting opinions are included. Gateway Links: |
| Radice v. People of NY
[1924] Court held conviction of restaurant owner employing women between the hours of 10 PM and 6AM in violation of New York State Act of 1917. The law is an extension of the Police Power of the Constitution and protects women from the "injurious consequences" of which men are not as susceptible. Gateway Links: |
| West Coast Hotel v. Parish
[1937] The Court, in a majority opinion by Charles Hughes, ruled that the freedom to contract is subject to legislative restraints in its decision to uphold a Washington law guaranteeing women and children a minimum wage. Their action overturned the rule that such restraint violates the Fourteenth Amendment's due process guarantee (Lochner v. New York [1905] and Adkins v. Children's Hospital [1923]). It also found that women; based on their physical stature, maternal duties, and unequal bargaining position required state protection. The majority countered George Sutherland's dissent that women were "legally as capable of contracting for themselves as men," by arguing that laws need not encompass all manifestations of the same wrong. Some women's group opposed the decision stating that the special protection created employment barriers. Gateway Links: |
| Goesaert v. Cleary
[1948] Michigan excluded women from obtaining a necessary license to bartend in cities where the population exceeded 50,000 unless they were the wife or daughter of a male owner. Citing the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, some sought to overturn the law. Felix Frankfurter, writing for the majority, stated that the legislature's apparent desire to keep women safe in a morally challenged environment provided a reasonable basis for the distinction. The dissenting Court members argued the regulation prohibited female owners, even if a male were present, from operating their establishments and thereby violated the Fourteenth amendment. Gateway Links: |
| Phillips v. Martin Marietta
[1971] Ida Phillips, under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights, charged Martin Marietta Corporation with sexual discrimination when it declined her job application because of her pre-school age children. Men did not experience the same condition. The Court ruled that, although an exception existed for such a condition, the Appeals Court erred when it granted a summary judgment and dismissed the case without trial. They remanded it back for trial. In a concurring opinion Thurgood Marshall argued the exception base on family duties reinforced stereotypes Congress sought to preclude when considering job qualifications. Gateway Links: |
| U. of PA v. EEOC
[1990] Decided by a vote of 9 to 0. The Supreme Court forced the University of Pennsylvania to release tenure-file related documents. This decision was necessary after a female associate professor filed a charge with the EEOC alleging discrimination. Gateway Links: |
| International Union v. Johnson Controls
[1991] Decided by a vote of 9 to 0. The Supreme Court decided that it is okay for women to work in jobs that are not safe for human fetuses. Gateway Links: |
| Minor v. Happersett
(1874)
Decided by a vote of 9 to 0.
Conflict:
But Virginia Minor was no ordinary woman and neither was her husband, Francis, an ordinary man. She was the president of the Missouri National Woman Suffrage Association, and Francis Minor had laid out at its annual convention in 1869 the legal rationale for claiming that the Fourteenth Amendment guaranteed women the right to vote. Together they were a formidable team. He wrote, moreover, most of the legal briefs presented to the state and federal courts in this case. The challenge Virginia Minor threw at the Court began by asserting that "there can be no half-way citizenship" under the Constitution. She argued that the disfranchisement of women inflicted punishment on them without a judicial trial, and was a violation of the constitutional guarantee of due process. She also claimed that voting was protected under the First Amendment as a form of free expression, under the Thirteenth Amendment because the disfranchisement of citizens was a form of involuntary servitude, and under the Fourteenth Amendment because voting in national elections was a privilege and immunity of national citizenship rather than simply a privilege of state citizenship. Opinion:
Chief Justice Morrison Waite wrote the unanimous opinion of the Court. He noted that voting was not a right or privilege of the Constitution. He asserted that the framers of the Constitution had never intended to grant suffrage to women, despite the fact that they were indeed citizens and persons in the eyes of the law. Citizenship, in the Court's opinion, did not carry with it the right of suffrage. It was the Court's responsibility, he stated, "... to decide what the law is, not to declare what it should be." He maintained that Virginia Minor was indeed a citizen of the United States and the state of Missouri, but state law did not allow her to vote. States could, without violating the federal Constitution, deny women the right to vote because neither the original Constitution nor the Fourteenth Amendment required states to permit women to vote. In other words, the right to vote was not a federal privilege protected by the Constitution. It was a privilege to be granted by the states. Waite also pointed out, that no new state admitted to the Union had ever conferred the right of suffrage to women. The Court further stated that if the privileges and immunities clause of the Fourteenth Amendment gave all citizens the vote, there would have been no need for the Fifteenth Amendment, which allowed a subset of citizens (previously enslaved African-American men) to vote. Because no adjustment to the Fifteenth Amendment specifically stated that women could vote, it was constitutional for states to deny women the vote. Context:
Anthony's case was never taken to the Supreme Court. Because her counsel had paid her bail to keep her out of jail, she was not imprisoned and could not ask the Supreme Court to hear her case under a writ of habeas corpus. Also, because the judge in the case did not enforce his judgment, she had no claim to appeal a meaningless verdict. States could and did limit the right to vote based upon a variety of conditions over time including color, literacy, wealth, age, and sex. The Fifteenth Amendment set forth that states could not deny citizens the right to vote based on race, color, or previous condition of servitude. This amendment was designed to enable men to vote who had previously been enslaved, but because it did not include gender or sex the Amendment could not easily be used to support suffrage for women. Women in New Jersey had been given the right to vote in 1776 in the state constitution. In 1807 the state law was rewritten to only allow tax-paying, white male citizens to vote. In the Territory of Wyoming women could vote, and when Wyoming became a state in 1890 the grant of suffrage to women was maintained. By 1900, a handful of states, e.g., Utah, Idaho, and Colorado, gave women the vote, but it remained a state-by-state issue until the passage of the Nineteenth Amendment (1920). Impact/Consequences:
The defeat of Virginia Minor in 1872, along with the arrest of Susan B. Anthony in that same year, marked a turning point in the women's movement. Thereafter, women began to look less to the courts for redress under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments and more to the political struggle for a suffrage amendment to the Constitution. This produced a movement that placed most of its energy into gaining the vote while backing away from many other reforms aimed at full citizenship for women, such as equal pay, jury duty, inclusion in professions and occupations and schools, domicile rights, divorce reform, access to birth control and abortion, child custody, and working conditions. These issues did not emerge again as priorities until the 1960s. Quotes:
"...we declare our faith in the principles of self-government; our full equality with man in natural rights; that woman was made first for her own happiness, with the absolute right to herself--to all opportunities and advantages life affords for her complete development; and we deny that dogma for centuries, incorporated in the codes of all nations--that women was made for man--her best interests ... to be sacrificed to his will." --Declaration of Rights, 1876 "Sir, when the women ... love to be jostled ... [in] trade and business; when they love the treachery and the turmoil of politics; when they love the ... blood of battle better than they love the affections ... of home and family, then it will be time to talk about ... women voters." --George Williams, Oregon Republican Senator, 1866. Female Suffrage "would weaken and finally break up and destroy the Christian family. The social unit is the family, not the individual; and the greatest danger to American society is, that we are rapidly becoming a nation of isolated individuals, without family ties or affections. The family has already been much weakened, and is fast disappearing.... We do not believe women ... fit to have their own head ... Revelation asserts, a and universal experience proves that the man is the head of the woman, and that the woman is for the man, not the man for the woman." --Orestes Bronson, 1873. Are Women People Questions to Ponder:
What other requirements exist today that limit the right to vote? Should the legislative or judicial branch of the federal government decide who gets to vote? If it had been left to the states to allow women to vote, is it possible that women in some states would be able to vote for President while women in other states would not be able to vote. What would be the consequence of this? Do you think that it mattered that women won the right to vote? Present an argument that says that suffrage for women has not advanced equality for them. And why do you think so many women opposed the Equal Rights Amendment? Some women opposed giving women the right to vote because they thought it would weaken their power and authority as women. Does this make any sense? Present an argument that supports this position. Selected Bibliography:
Graham, Sara Hunter. Woman Suffrage and the New Democracy (1996) Lunardini, Ghristine A. From Equal Suffrage to Equal Rights: Alice Paul and the National Woman's Party, 1910-1929 (1986) Mathews, Jean. Woman's Struggle for Equality: The First Phase, 1828-1876 (1997) Smith-Rosenberg, Carroll. Disorderly Conduct: Visions of Gender Gateway Links: |
| Bunting v. OR
[1917] Court held indictment of mill owner who required workers to work more than 10 hours without overtime pay, in violation of Oregon State act. At issue was the question of whether or not the law addressed health protection or wage regulation. Gateway Links: |
| Leser v. Garnett
[1922] Civil Court rules that the Nineteenth Amendment was duly ratified and is part of the Constitution. Gateway Links: |
| Breedlove v. Sutles
[1937] A twenty-eight year old white male challenged the legality of a $1.00 poll tax collected annually from all men between the ages of 21 to 60 and women who registered to vote. The exempted the blind. He claimed it prevented him from voting which violated the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the exclusion of women equaled discrimination as defined by the Nineteenth Amendment. Pierce Butler, for the majority stated the first challenge failed because "equal protection does not require absolute equality." The second challenges did not hold because "the burdens necessarily borne by them [women] for the preservation of the race," allows the state to "exempt them from the poll tax." In addition, Georgia declared the husband as the legal head of the household and the financial hardship of paying the tax would have fallen to him. Gateway Links: |
| Glasser v. U.S.
[1942] Glasser, a federal prosecutor based in Illinois, convicted of accepting bribes in regards to liquor law violations, sought a new trial, among other reasons, because women were excluded from the grand jury pool in violation of state law. In the majority opinion, given by Frank Murphy, the Court dismissed the defense because the law went into effect shortly before the trial and did not provide the state enough time to generate a list of women from which to chose. However, based on other challenges, Glasser did receive an order for a new trial. Gateway Links: |
 |